From owner-qed Thu Nov 10 02:30:36 1994
Received: from localhost (listserv@localhost) by antares.mcs.anl.gov (8.6.4/8.6.4) id CAA05464 for qed-out; Thu, 10 Nov 1994 02:29:34 -0600
Received: from bos1a.delphi.com (SYSTEM@bos1a.delphi.com [192.80.63.1]) by antares.mcs.anl.gov (8.6.4/8.6.4) with ESMTP id CAA05456 for <qed@mcs.anl.gov>; Thu, 10 Nov 1994 02:29:27 -0600
Received: from delphi.com by delphi.com (PMDF V4.3-9 #7804)
 id <01HJASSYW7KW9UNGQY@delphi.com>; Thu, 10 Nov 1994 03:26:53 -0500 (EST)
Date: Thu, 10 Nov 1994 03:26:53 -0500 (EST)
From: Lyle Burkhead <LYBRHED@delphi.com>
Subject: Platonism
To: qed@mcs.anl.gov
Message-id: <01HJASSYW7KY9UNGQY@delphi.com>
X-VMS-To: INTERNET"qed@mcs.anl.gov"
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: TEXT/PLAIN; CHARSET=US-ASCII
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
Sender: owner-qed@mcs.anl.gov
Precedence: bulk



>A-Platonism is the opinion that our mathematical objects have a
>real existence in some real world.

Apparently this means that all mathematical objects are on the same footing.   

Another possibility would be D-platonism: some mathematical objects have a 
real existence and others don't.  

>An essential difference is that the mathematician may even be cheating: 
>he starts with some assumptions that he wants to disprove, in the course of 
>the argument he constructs objects, treats them psychologically as existing 
>things, until at the end a contradiction is reached and the whole edifice 
>falls into pieces.  

A D-platonist is not committed to the actual existence of such objects. 




